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AMERICAN FOREIGN LAW 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
 
Panel Discussion: 
 
“Litigation in the U.S. and in the Civil Law System: 
What can we learn from each other?” 
 
Opening remarks of James R. Maxeiner* 
 
Drake Hotel, New York City 
March 15, 1995 
 
I. 
Our meeting is very timely. Civil justice reform 
was on the front page of the New York Times 
almost every day last week. The House of Rep-
resentatives passed three law and litigation re-
form measures: “The Common Sense Product 
Liability and Legal Reform Act,” the “Attorney 
Accountability Act,” and  the “Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act.” According to the Times, “the 
Clinton Administration has decided to wage a 
vigorous fight against legislation that would 
drastically reshape the nation’s legal system …”1 
The Administration apparently regards the Re-
publican proposals as so extreme that they would 
“tilt the legal playing field dramatically to the 
disadvantage of consumers and middle-class 
citizens.”2  
What is the drastic reshaping that the Clinton 
Administration is fighting? The challenged 
measures would “set Federal standards in all 
product-injury lawsuits, even those decided by 
state courts; would impose strict limits on puni-
tive damages in all civil cases, and would require 
the loser in many lawsuits to pay the legal costs 
of the winner.”3 Are these reforms really so dras-
tic? One thing we can learn from Civil Law sys-
tems, I think, is that these so-called reforms are 
not really so drastic. If we look to the European 
Union, which is not exactly known for hostility 
                                                 
                                                
*J.D., LL.M. Dr. jur. (Munich). 
1 March 6, 1995. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
to consumers and middle-class citizens, we see 
that in the EU there are Union standards for 
product injury lawsuits, even those decided in 
state courts, generally no punitive damages, and 
requirements that the loser pay the legal costs of 
the winner. On the other hand, comparison with 
European practices could well inform the Repub-
licans’ proposals in at least two respects. (1) The 
Republican proposals are, like so much of 
American law reform, piecemeal and unsystem-
atic; they address only a few small aspects of the 
litigation crisis and only for parts of the system. 
(2) The Republican proposals are generally not 
very well thought out. Cost-shifting is a good 
example of both of these points. It is to apply 
only to diversity cases. The proposals scarcely 
begin to deal with issues, such as determining 
the extent of the costs to be shifted, that have 
occupied much legislation and many decisions in 
those countries that have cost shifting. 
II. 
The subtitle of today’s meeting is: “what can we 
learn from each other?”  The title is an optimistic 
one for it assumes that we are willing to learn 
from others. American lawyers have not shown 
much interest in learning from other systems of 
procedure. Almost twenty years ago, AFLA 
member Rudolf Schlesinger made “A Plea for 
Utilizing Foreign Experience” in the area of 
criminal procedure.4 His plea drew little re-
sponse. Ten years ago, Professor John Langbein, 
now of Yale, argued for “The German Advan-
 
4 26 Buff. L. Rev. 361 (1977). 
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tage in Civil Procedure”5 and drew responses 
ranging from (1) you’re wrong, there is no ad-
vantage,6 through (2) you exalt efficiency too 
much, inefficiency is better,7 to (3) you may be 
right, but there is no way that we can adopt what 
they do here.8 Two years ago, our distinguished 
moderator, Whit Gray, at a convention of the 
Association of American Law Schools, called on 
his colleagues to investigate German civil proce-
dure. Yet all the principal reports on reform of 
civil procedure—the Quayle Commission, the 
Congressional Federal Courts Study Committee, 
the American Bar Association Blue Print, and 
the Brookings Institution Study—essentially pay 
foreign procedure no mind at all. 
Why are we not interested in learning from for-
eign civil procedure? Already in 1929, Edson 
Sunderland, who was one of the principal draft-
ers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ex-
plained our lack of interest as a result of (1) 
“professional prejudice against new ideas, based 
on national conservation and the monopolistic 
nature of judicial agencies,” and (2) ignorance, 
because Americans aren’t good linguists and 
relevant materials are not readily available in 
English.”9 These explanations are as valid as 
ever. In particular, professional prejudice against 
new ideas is particularly pronounced in the area 
of civil procedure. What Professor Schlesinger 
wrote of criminal procedure applies equally well 
to civil procedure: “U.S. lawyers are possessed 
by a feeling of superiority that seems to grow in 
direct proportion to the ever increasing weight of 
the accumulating evidence demonstrating the 
total failure of our system …”10
There is, I think, another reason why U.S. law-
yers are not interested in foreign civil procedure. 
American lawyers tend to be a very practical 
bunch of individuals. Still stronger than the prac-
tical-orientation is their practice orientation. If an 
idea can not be plugged in to be used instantly, it 
does not have much appeal. Comparing U.S. 
civil procedure with European Civil Law civil 
                                                 
                                                
5 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985). 
6 Allen, Köck, Reichenberg & Rosen, “The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More De-
tails and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholar-
ship,” 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705 (1988). 
7 Samuel R. Gross, “The American Advantage: The 
Value of Inefficient Litigation,” 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 
(1987). 
8 Reitz, “Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure,” 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 
(1990). 
9 Book Review, 15 A.B.A.J. 35-36. 
10 Supra note 4, at 363. 
procedure therefore creates problems. They are 
two very different systems and it is very hard to 
look at any single element in isolation and sensi-
bly transfer it to a discussion of civil procedure 
in the other jurisdiction. This problem of view-
ing a solution in context is not peculiar to com-
parative procedure, but it may be a bit more pro-
nounced there and therefore more an obstacle in 
learning from others.  
III. 
It is, of course, a fundamental objective of our 
Association to strive to counteract professional 
prejudice against foreign legal ideas and to pro-
mote learning from foreign experiences.11 On 
this, the 70th anniversary of our Association, I 
would like to draw attention to some comments 
of one of our association’s earliest and most 
steadfast of foreign members, Pierre LePaulle. 
LePaulle was a French Avocat à la Cour d’Appel 
de Paris who spent some time at Harvard Law 
School in the 1920s. When it was that he first 
joined the Association, I don’t know, but it was 
very soon after our founding. He was on the old-
est membership list I have—from 1934—as one 
of just 75 members total and one of only three 
members residing abroad. He remained on the 
membership roster through to 1976.  
LePaulle was keenly aware of the American lack 
of interest in foreign law in general and in civil 
procedure in particular. He began an article that 
he published in the Harvard Law Review in 1922 
with the observation that “One of the first things 
to strike a foreigner who comes in contact with 
American lawyers is the general lack of interest 
in questions of comparative law.”12  
LePaulle was, as I think most comparativists and 
most of us here are, a great believer in the value 
of comparative law even when there is no possi-
bility or intention to borrow directly from the 
foreign legal system. LePaulle ended the article I 
just mentioned by calling attention to how 
knowledge of foreign law gives one new per-
spective on one’s own system. He stated that he 
never completely understood French law before 
coming to the United States and studying our 
system. “When one is immersed in his own law, 
in his own country, unable to see things from 
 
11 Our stated goal is “to advance learning by promot-
ing the study, understanding and practice of foreign, 
comparative and international law and the diffusion of 
knowledge in the United States and abroad devoted to 
the subjects mentioned …” 
12 “The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique 
of Sociological Jurisprudence,” Harvard L. Rev. 838 
(1922). 
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without, he has a psychologically unavoidable 
tendency to consider as natural, as necessary, as 
given by God, things which are simply due to 
historical accident or temporary social situation. 
… To see things in their true light, we must see 
them from a certain distance, as strangers, which 
is impossible when we study any phenomena of 
our own country.”13 If we could persuade our 
American (and European) colleagues of this 
benefit, we would be well on the way toward 
answering the question, “what can we learn from 
each other?” 
IV. 
So what can we learn from each other? LePaulle 
called on American lawyers to take advantage of 
what the Civil Law has done in the area of civil 
procedure. He expressed “his amazement at the 
ineffective manner in which justice is adminis-
tered … more like a high church ceremony 
than a business transaction.”14 Writing more 
recently of the German system of civil proce-
dure, John Langbein made a similar comparison: 
“German civil proceedings have the tone not of 
theatre, but of a routine business meeting—
serious rather than tense.”15 In the interest of full 
disclosure, I want to say now that in making spe-
cific comparisons, I am limiting my  remarks to 
the two systems in which I have received formal 
legal schooling: the U.S. and the German. In the 
discussion that follows, some of the others pre-
sent today may be able to say whether the com-
parisons I draw apply to other Civil Law systems 
of civil procedure. 
When one sees both systems from afar, then 
LePaulle’s distinction jumps out. One does not 
have to call it ceremony versus business. In a 
less provocative sound bite, one could draw a 
distinction between focusing on providing a 
day-in-court versus focusing on providing a 
reasoned decision. The integrity of the process, 
in the American system, rests squarely on the 
opportunity of the parties to participate in it.16 In 
the German system, the integrity of the process 
rests rather more on the product of that process 
and rather less on active participation in the 
process itself than does the American. 
                                                 
                                                
13 Id. at  858. 
14 Quoted in Sunderland, Book Review, 15 A.B.A.J. 
35 (1929). 
15 Langbein, above note 5, at 831. 
16 “Adjudication is a process of decision that grants to 
the affected party a form of participation that consists 
in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned ar-
guments.” Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Ad-
judication,” 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978). 
American lawyers are skeptical of an objective 
application of preexisting rules to a case and 
therefore tend to emphasize more the importance 
of telling one’s story to a neutral fact-finder. In 
discussing the Rule of Law, American jurispru-
dential scholars have spoken of two poles of 
importance in adjudication somewhat analogous 
to the distinction between day-in-court and rea-
soned decision: they speak of courts versus 
rules. They denigrate as a mere “pretense” the 
idea that “the law is a system of known rules 
applied by a judge”.17 For them, civil procedure 
is fair because the parties receive a day-in-court. 
As a result, our law is concerned, perhaps an 
outside observer might even say consumed, with 
what we think essential to a day-in-court. We 
worry about notice and hearing, about intricate 
questions of admissible and inadmissible evi-
dence, about prejudicial knowledge of the trier-
of-fact, and so on. We worry surprisingly little 
about what decision itself results. In the end, 
judges, both at the trial and appellate levels, are 
responsible for assuring that each side had his or 
her fair day in court rather than that the decision 
is correct. 
The German system of civil procedure is less 
fixated on a day-in-court. To be sure, there is a 
right to be heard (“rechtliches Gehör”), but what 
the German system focuses on is the final deci-
sion of the Court. In the end, judges, again both 
at trial and appellate levels, are responsible for 
producing rationally supported decisions. The 
goal of German procedure is determination of a 
concrete legal situation in a correct judgment. 
The day-in-court is just incidental to that goal.  
Our fixation with day-in-court I think says a lot 
about the political line-up of the supporters and 
opponents of the Republicans’ proposals. Corpo-
rations are generally little interested in getting a 
hearing on some novel theory of law or having 
an opportunity to make a pitch to a jury to get it 
to decide out of sympathy rather than grounded 
in law. Liberal and conservative activists may be 
more interested in getting a day-in-court to  per-
suade a judge to come up with a novel interpre-
tation of law. The underinsured may want  to 
convince a jury to decide out of sympathy to 
award a high judgment. Ironically, however, our 
enthusiasm for the day-in-court has made that 
day-in-court so terribly expensive that it is out-
of-reach to most of those who do not have the 
wealth of O.J. Simpson. What we can learn from 
civil law systems, I think, is to put more empha-
 
17E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 
(1948). 
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sis on what the Court’s final decision is and less 
emphasis on having that elusive day-in-court. I 
think if we do, we may achieve more justice and 
more days-in-court. 
V. 
I would like to point out some specific manifes-
tations of day-in-court versus reasoned deci-
sion thinking. Each of these, I think, may help us 
realize how different our system is from others. 
Each of these, I think, would be fertile ground 
for investigation of how alternative systems 
work. 
1. Legal education. My first manifestation may 
seem a bit far-fetched: legal education. But the 
different orientations of legal procedure are al-
ready manifested there. U.S. legal education 
trains law students to become advocates. Exami-
nations test issue spotting. German legal educa-
tion trains law students to become judges. Ex-
aminations focus on supporting issue resolution. 
One might well wonder whether this leads to 
Americans lawyers being more likely to find 
areas to dispute, and therefore, to require more 
days-in-court. 
2. Initial stages of a lawsuit. An American law-
suit is oriented toward eventually going to trial; a 
German lawsuit is oriented toward reaching a 
final judgment. An American lawsuit begins 
with a complaint that has to provide no more 
information than “notice”  that a claim is made; 
it may leave the defendant in the dark about what 
the defendant has done that supposedly warrants 
a judgment. In the early stages of an American 
lawsuit, in preparation for that day-in-court, the 
parties conduct discovery to learn what the con-
tent of “their case” and the content of “their op-
ponent’s case” will be. The parties need that 
information so that they can present their cases 
in the most favorable light and without surprises. 
In a German lawsuit, the plaintiff must file a 
detailed claim that spells out not only the basis 
for the claim, but also the evidence that the 
plaintiff intends to rely on. In the early stages of 
a German lawsuit, the judge reviews the filings 
of the parties to make sure that they are both 
“permissible” (Zulässig) and “sound” (Schlüs-
sig). These reviews take place in every case. The 
judge is required to examine all bases for a claim 
and to permit only those to be made which can 
seriously be regarded as permissible and sound. 
A claim is permissible if it meets all formal pre-
requisites for litigation, e.g., proper service, ju-
risdiction, absence of applicable statute of limita-
tions. A claim is sound if the individual asser-
tions of the plaintiff’s submissions satisfy the 
abstract elements of the claim. Plaintiffs must 
substantiate their allegations. Apparently analo-
gous American pretrial motions are not truly 
analogous, both since they occur only on motion 
and because judges are most reluctant to grant 
these motions which would, in effect, deny 
plaintiffs a day-in-court. 
3. Control of the case. We speak of, in the 
United States, “the plaintiff’s case.” That con-
cept does not fit into the German system of civil 
procedure. In Germany, the judge controls the 
sequence of the case and considers issues 
deemed central first. In the United States, each 
side’s lawyers first investigate the case fully in 
the discovery stage. Then later, at trial, they pre-
sent their cases in full, first plaintiff, then defen-
dant. We rarely focus on just how inefficient and 
costly this procedure is, but comparison makes 
that clear. Suppose a plaintiff in the United 
States brings a case involving four different 
claims. Each claim requires proof of four differ-
ent factual elements. One element is common to 
all, and the parties dispute it ferociously. In 
Germany, the judge would address the common 
issue first. Resolution of that issue, which could 
be simple and requiring hearing only a witness 
or two, could obviate consideration of other, 
possibly more complicated issues. Those other 
issues could consume months of discovery and 
weeks of trial in the United States. Similarly, 
because the parties control the case, they may 
spend a great deal of time on issues that a judge 
would regard as irrelevant or immaterial. They 
may see these issues, however, as part of their 
day-in-court and as useful means to persuade a 
jury to find in their favor. 
4. Evidence. In Germany, the court has main 
responsibility for gathering and evaluating evi-
dence. The judge prepares the case, serves as 
principal examiner and summarizes testimony. In 
the United States, each side prepares its own 
case for presentation to the court. The judge re-
mains passive, there is no judicial preparation of 
the case, the parties’ lawyers serve as principal 
examiners, and there are verbatim transcripts of 
testimony. It is no wonder that, as a result, depo-
sitions and trial testimony here are reckoned in 
days and in half days, whereas in Germany, tes-
timony is reckoned in hours and half- hours. 
How long does one side really need to cross-
examine the other’s witness? It would seem in 
the O.J. Simpson trial, weeks! 
5. Witnesses. In Germany, witnesses are ques-
tioned first by the judge. In the United States, 
they are prepared by lawyers beforehand to give 
testimony. Testimony there is generally unre-
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hearsed whereas here it is staged. There judges 
are concerned with getting the gist of the testi-
mony and commonly repeat back to the witness 
what they heard to make sure that they under-
stand what the witness intended and not merely 
what the witness said. Here, we try to trap wit-
nesses, get them to look bad, and to say things 
that they do not intend to say. 
6. Experts. In Germany, expert witnesses are 
chosen by the judge and are supposed to be neu-
tral. In the United States, experts are chosen by 
the parties. It should not be a wonder that they 
function as advocates. We want them to do that 
since, in expert testimony as in factual testi-
mony, we feel that each side should have its day-
in-court to  present its view.18
7. Judgment. In the United States, it is not con-
sidered essential to the integrity of civil proce-
dure that  reasons be given for the decision ren-
dered.19 Although reasons are regarded as help-
ful and may be required where a judge decides 
without jury, we have not ever generally re-
quired them, probably because of the difficulties 
perceived in trying to get a reasoned statement 
from a body of lay jurors. In German procedure, 
a statement of reasons is essential. It is grounds 
for mandatory reversal if there is no statement of 
reasons.20 The lack of a reasoned opinion makes 
appeal to correct an erroneous decision difficult, 
since appellate judges can not know what the 
trial court based the decision on. It permits juries 
to reach compromise verdicts that can have no 
basis in law as well as allows them to decide 
contrary to law. Jury verdicts will be upheld so 
long as there was some evidence to support the 
verdict, even though contrary evidence was 
nearly overwhelming. 
8. Costs of proceedings. The English system of 
cost-shifting is so controversial precisely be-
cause it is seen to threaten the access of the citi-
zenry to courts. By imposing on the loser the 
costs of the proceeding, it is feared we will deter 
parties from presenting their cases to the courts. 
In most parts of the world, however, the logical 
force of cost-shifting is irrefutable. If the pur-
pose of the legal proceeding is to determine a 
claim of right, and the claim goes against the 
person asserting it, it is only fair that the person 
who has the claim of right not be subjected to the 
                                                 
18 See generally Maxeiner, “The Expert in U.S. and 
German Patent Litigation,” 22 IIC Int. Rev. of Indus-
trial Property and Copyright L. 595 (1991). 
19 Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion,” 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978). 
20 ZPO § 551 Nr. 7. 
costs of the determination. Here, however, with 
our fixation of right to a day-in-court we fear, 
rightly, that litigants who have to pay for that 
day-in-court will be less likely to seek it. 
9. Appeal. In the United States, appeal basically 
reviews whether the rules of the game were ad-
hered to in the trial court. One could even say, 
whether the parties got their day in court. In the 
German system, on the other hand, the first level 
of appeal is concerned with whether the initial 
level’s decision was correct. Consequently, the 
appellate court can and does hear witnesses and 
take other evidence. Professor Damaška of Yale 
has pointed out that in American law “what is 
actually reviewed is the propriety of the material 
submitted to the decision maker for decision 
rather than his ‘correct’ use of it.”21 There are 
several deleterious consequences of the Ameri-
can approach for efficient adjudication of which 
now I mention only two. (1) If the appellate 
court finds an error was committed at trial, ordi-
narily all that it can do is return the whole case 
for a new trial to the trial court. Thus the concept 
of ‘harmless error’ to avoid having to so com-
pletely waste what has gone on before. (2) In 
order to avoid such a drastic consequence, a trial 
court is likely to err in its deliberations on the 
side of letting parties spend too long with wit-
nesses and make arguments that are indeed frivo-
lous. 
VI. 
If we would only look at foreign procedure, I 
think that we would have a much better under-
standing of what alternatives there are. We 
would realize just how myopic we are. We 
would see that proposed “revolutions” in our law 
are tame and timid responses to difficult prob-
lems. 
 
                                                 
21 “Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure,” 84 Yale L. J. 480, 515 (1975). 
  
